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Beyond Business Ethics
David Lutz
The contemporary
academic sub-discipline of business ethics is an inadequate corrective to unethical
business practices, not only because the most popular theories of business ethics
are based upon philosophical mistakes, but also because the entire enterprise
of academic business ethics is fundamentally confused and doomed to irrelevance.
Business ethics theory relates to business management theory by contradicting
it, without providing an alternative theory of management. Attempting to instil
ethical standards into business firms that are obedient to Anglo-American management
theory is like trying to instil oil in water. What is required is a comprehensive
philosophical theory of the ethical practice of business management. This must
involve not merely contradicting the dominant business management theory, but
also replacing it. This project is consistent not only with the long tradition
of Western culture that was rejected during the “Enlightenment”, but also with
the traditional cultures of sub-Saharan Africa.
After rejecting
the dominant theory of business management, pointing out the mistakes of attempts
to argue that “good ethics is good business”, and showing the inadequacy of
business ethics theory, this paper will suggest the direction in which to escape
from the present predicament.
1. Agency
Theory
According to the theory
of business management dominant in the West today, agency or shareholder theory,
the managers of a business corporation are obligated to maximize longterm owner
value. This theory is often called “agency theory”, because it is frequently
based on the assumption that owners are principals and managers are their agents.
It is sometimes called “shareholder theory”, because the owners of most large
corporations are shareholders. This approach originated within the Anglo-American
cultural tradition, but is now being taught in business schools around the globe.
It is problematic, for several reasons.
First, according to
the British legal tradition, in which the concept of the agency relationship
originated, managers are not agents of the owners of the corporation for which
they work, but are instead agents of the corporation itself. Within this tradition,
the business corporation is understood to be a legal person, distinct from its
human members. As an extreme form of Anglo-American individualism was accepted
by financial management theorists, however, the idea of the existence of a corporation
became unintelligible. In the seventeenth century, while the British legal tradition
recognized the business corporation as a legal person, Thomas Hobbes regarded
political organizations as artificial: “By art is created that great Leviathan
called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, Civitas), which is but an
artificial man.”
[1] In the eighteenth century Jeremy Bentham wrote that a community
is a fiction: “The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual
persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The
interest of the community then is, what? – the sum of the interests of the several
members who compose it.”
[2]
In the twentieth century
this understanding of human organizations was applied to the business corporation
by scholars such as Milton Friedman: “A corporation is an artificial person”.
[3] Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling asserted in an influential
article: “The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction
that serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and is also characterized
by the existence of divisible residual claims on the organization’s assets and
cash flows, which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting
individuals.
[4] As Eugene Fama puts it, “The firm is just the set of contracts
covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from
outputs are shared among inputs.”
[5] Or, in the words of Steven N. S. Cheung, “The word ‘firm’ is
simply a shorthand description of a way to organize activities under contractual
arrangements that differ from those of ordinary product markets.”
[6] Financial management theorists then conclude that if business
managers are agents and if the business corporation does not exist, then managers
must be agents of the owners of the (non-existent) corporation. But this is
a mistake; managers are agents of the corporation itself. Therefore, if it is
true that managers are obligated to maximize owner value, this cannot be for
the reason that they are the owners’ agents.
A second problem for
agency theory is that it both maintains that managers are obligated to maximize
the wealth of owners and assumes that managers are motivated to maximize their
own utility functions: “In theory, capital projects should be analyzed by reference
to the objective of maximization of stockholders’ wealth (MSW). In practice
there are asymmetries of information and managers may seek to maximise their
personal utility.”
[7] From this discrepancy between what managers should do, according
to this theory, and what they have motives to do, according to the assumption
that they are “rational” maximizers of their own individual utility functions,
“agency problems” originate:
"According to
agency theory managers are considered agents of stockholders, the owners of
the corporation. These agents manage the resources of the corporation, but do
not bear the wealth effects of their actions. In such a situation, managers
have the opportunity and incentive to make choices and decisions regarding the
use of firm resources that benefit them personally at the cost of the firm,
giving rise to agency problems. "[8]
Ingenious schemes have
been devised in the attempt to align managers’ self-interest and the interests
of shareholders: “At the senior executive ranks, compensation arrangements typically
contain four basic components: a base salary, an annual bonus tied to accounting
performance, stock options and other longterm incentive plans including multiyear
accountingbased performance plans.”
[9] One consequence of these schemes – as has recently become public
knowledge with the cases of Enron, WorldCom, and many smaller firms – is that
managers seeking to maximize their own utility functions have an incentive to
manipulate share price, for instance, by improperly shifting liabilities to
off-balance-sheet entities. Once a manager is persuaded that the goal of business
is to make as much money as possible (for someone else), it is a small step
to conclude that his own goal should be to make as much money as possible for
himself. Enron’s executives, for example, inflated their corporation’s share
price by transferring its problems to the balance sheets of subsidiaries registered
in the Cayman Islands and awarded millions of shares to themselves. Then, when
the chickens began coming home to roost, the executives sold their shares for
$1.3 billion (while exhorting their employees to buy shares). In the end, they
minimized shareholder value and wiped out the savings and pensions of
many Enron employees.
A third problem with
agency theory is that, in many situations, managerial actions that maximize
owner value, even long-term owner value, are unethical. Among the kinds of unethical
actions that may maximize long-term owner value under particular circumstances
are: marketing a product that is not a genuine good or service, advertising
dishonestly or deceptively, advertising in a manner that exploits consumers’
vices, treating employees unjustly, performing intrinsically evil acts (e.g.,
aborting fetuses for profit and selling the organs and tissue of aborted fetuses
[10] ), cutting costs by selling unsafe products, and paying bribes.
For these three reasons,
agency theory must be judged unsatisfactory. In most Western business schools
today, the principle that managers must strive to maximize long-term owner value
is regarded as an axiom requiring no argument. It is, however, a normative theory
of human action that has emerged from a particular philosophical and cultural
tradition, and should be subjected to critique and assessment just like any
other normative theory of human action. When it is assessed, it is found to
be indefensible.
2. “Good Ethics
is Good Business”
Although the majority
of business ethicists agree that many owner-value-maximizing actions are unethical,
some deny this and argue instead that “good ethics is good business”, at least
for most of the time. Norman Barry, for example, sees a natural harmony between
ethics and capitalism: “All the differing types of capitalist systems recognise
and depend on a generic morality: it [sic] covers trust, honesty, respect for
property and the sanctity of contract.”
[11] According to him, ethics does not conflict with the pursuit
of profit; rather, it enables profit to be pursued more effectively. Nevertheless,
attempts to defend this position are unsuccessful.
2.1 Patrick
Primeaux and John Stieber
Patrick Primeaux, SM
and John Stieber believe that good ethics and good business are synonymous:
“Since more is better than less from a given set of scarce resources, producing
where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost (MR = MC), profit maximizing,
is efficient and ethical. Producing where marginal revenue is greater than or
less than marginal cost, not profit maximizing, is inefficient and unethical.”
[12]
Primeaux and Stieber’s
argument contains several mistakes. After arguing that it is unethical for a
firm to produce at a point where marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost,
because the community will have fewer goods and services than if the firm maximized
its profit, they continue:
"If the firm
produces at a point where marginal revenue is less than marginal cost (MR <
MC), it is choosing a level of output that is greater than the profit-maximizing
output, and the community has more goods and services. The problem with this
decision is that it costs more to make these additional units of output than
the revenues they generate, and the company will lose money. It is axiomatic
that any firm continuing to produce at a loss will eventually go out of business.
Therefore, what first appears to be a windfall for the community turns into
a disaster. The firm shuts down, all of the things it once produced, including
the windfall, disappear; and the community has fewer goods and services.
"[13]
This is incorrect.
If the firm produces at a point where marginal revenue is less than marginal
cost, but total revenue exceeds total cost, the firm will not lose money. It
will merely make less money than the maximum it could make. This mistake is
surprising, since the authors also explain the mathematical relationship between
total cost/revenue and marginal cost/revenue in a footnote.
The authors offer in
support of their position an analogy between business and football:
"The individual
athlete approaches a game of football with his or her own personal sensibility
to a certain philosophical perspective, religious commitment, and adherence
to the law. That sensibility may even define the individual athlete and his
or her relationships with others. In practice, however, that sensibility is
“bracketed” or suspended as the rules of the game assume precedence. Of course,
the individual can make a prior choice to play or not to play, and perhaps philosophical,
religious or legal commitments may inspire that choice. But once that choice
has been made the rules of football dictate a certain behavior.
"[14]
One weakness of this
analogy is that playing football is an optional activity, while business is
the primary means of earning a living wage in industrialized countries. Hundreds
of millions of people have few alternatives other than to “play” business. Second,
there is more than one set of business rules, as Michel Albert implies in the
title and argues in the text of Capitalisme contre capitalisme.
[15] Two paragraphs later Primeaux and Stieber write, “We would
define business ethics in terms of neo-classical economic theory and its advocacy
of profit maximization.” But this is a choice of one among various alternative
definitions. A better analogy than football would be rugby, with the choice
between Rugby Union and Rugby League, or perhaps “football” understood broadly,
to include American Football, Association Football, Australian Football, etc.
Third, while there is little opportunity to reflect upon one’s ethical beliefs
while playing a football game, there is no reason why anyone who has initially
decided that playing the game is consistent with his ethical beliefs should
bracket or suspend those beliefs while playing. If the rules of football fit
without conflict into the larger context of one’s overall ethical commitment,
one can retain it while playing the game. For persons of moral integrity, the
unity of life includes athletic competition.
One of the reasons
Primeaux and Stieber are able to reconcile business ethics and profit maximization
is that they avoid (and believe managers should avoid) the responsibility of
judging whether a firm’s products are good. They believe that the role of business
within society is to “provide the goods and services the consumer wants”.
[16] They then explain, “The word ‘wants’ is deliberately used to
distance business from the judgmental implications of personal or communal ‘needs’.”
[17] In their judgment, managers should not make value judgments.
If consumers want pornography, condoms, and fetal tissue, the social role of
business is to provide them. Primeaux and Stieber then go on to define ethics
in terms of non-judgmentally producing whatever people want to buy:
"When business
men and women profit maximize, i.e., allocate resources efficiently, people
have more of the things they want, and that is good. When they do not
profit maximize, i.e., allocate scarce resources inefficiently, people have
less of the things they want, and that is bad... Since ethics is basically
a study of good and bad activity, then the decision to profit maximize or not
to profit maximize becomes a question of applied or practical ethics.
"[18]
The problem with this
position, however, is that it is not good to produce whatever people want when
what people want is not good. Business managers are responsible for exercising
judgment, including judgment about personal and social needs.
As Primeaux and Stieber
understand it, ethics plays two roles in relation to business management: one
internal and one external to the firm. Internally, ethics is by definition equivalent
to producing whatever consumers want to buy at the point where marginal cost
equals marginal revenue. There is no other role for ethics to play within the
firm. Externally, since the ethics of consumers influences what they wish to
buy, the ethics of society must be taken into account by managers when deciding
what to produce, so they can maximize profit. Interestingly, however, business
ethics and consumer ethics are quite different in nature. Within the firm, ethics
is absolute and non-individualistic: “Profit maximization does not include personal
ethics; only the opportunity costs of not being sensitive to the ethics of the
community.”
[19] If managers believe that their firms’ profit-maximizing actions
are unethical, they are obligated either to alter their personal ethics or to
resign. The authors praise Holiday
Inn founder Kemmons Wilson, who resigned as president
when his company’s opportunity to increase its profits by opening a hotel and
casino in Las Vegas conflicted with his personal belief that gambling is unethical:
“To his unending credit, his behavior was consistent with profit maximization.”
[20] Consumer ethics, in contrast, is relative and individualistic,
because each individual consumer is free to decide what he or she does and does
not want to buy:
"What determines
whether there exists a ‘want’ for guns? The individual consumer does. Were the
individual consumer to judge that he or she had no ‘want’ for this particular
product, it would not be produced ... There is, then, integral to the private
enterprise economic system a bias towards individual ethics and judgments. This
bias is grounded in a positive evaluation of individual human dignity and the
capacity of the human spirit to choose what is best for itself.
"[21]
Thus, Primeaux and
Stieber understand ethics to be individualistic and relative for persons not
engaged in business. Each individual is free to decide what products to buy
and to decide whether to become a businessman. But once he does decide to become
a businessman, he is obligated to bracket or suspend his personal ethical beliefs
and adopt absolutist “business ethics”, which is equivalent to profit maximization.
If he subsequently decides that he can no longer do this, his only option is
to cease to be a businessman. The authors do not explain why ethics can be individualistic
and relative for those who buy goods and services, but cannot be for those who
sell the same products.
Primeaux and Stieber
do not have an ethical theory at all; they simply call a particular economic
theory their theory of business ethics. They belong to the tradition of economism,
which attempts to apply economic theory beyond the boundaries of its relevance.
They believe that a manager whose personal ethics conflicts with his or her
firm’s profit maximization, but who is able to reconcile the conflict and stay
with the firm, has “sold all or part of his or her ethics for another set of
ethics”. They explain:
"One of the major
postulates of economics is that personal attributes and talents such as self-respect,
decency and ethics are also economic goods as are food, shelter and health care.
Like all economic goods, they also are bought and sold…
Like other people,
managers barter with their ethics. They trade, as everyone does, their childhood
ethics for adult ethics. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t mature. They also sell
their ethics for a money price, even putting aside/reconciling their personal
ethics for a good-paying job.
Whether the behavior
of buying and selling one’s personal ethics is right or wrong is the realm of
the philosophical or religious moralist. We know that people do it and that
the discipline of economics describes how they do it.
"[22]
It is also the realm
of the philosopher to identify the boundaries of other academic realms. Primeaux
and Stieber’s attempt to include the “buying and selling” of ethics within economics
is a case of academic imperialism, an attempt to include within its empire territory
that belongs to other academic disciplines. And their attempt to demonstrate
that good ethics and good business are synonymous is unsuccessful, because it
includes no ethical theory. It merely reduces business ethics to economics and
then shows that economics and economics are synonymous.
2.2 Milton
Friedman
Milton Friedman, one
of the most eloquent and influential advocates of American capitalism or “positive
economics”, has argued famously that “the social responsibility of business
is to increase its profits”.
[23] Friedman’s use of “social responsibility” in this sentence
is intentionally ironic. He also writes: “What does it mean to say that the
corporate executive has a ‘social responsibility’ in his capacity as businessman?
If this statement is not pure rhetoric, it must mean that he is to act in some
way that is not in the interest of his employers.” And he goes on to state clearly
that business managers should never act in such a way. His position is not that
the business managers’ social responsibility coincides with the increase of
profits, but that the business manager qua business manager has no social
responsibility at all, only a non-social responsibility to act in the interests
of the owners of the firm for which he works.
Ethics is, however,
permitted to play a limited role in Friedman’s ideal world. If the owners of
a corporation wish to let their acquisition of wealth be tempered with the ethical
custom of the society in which they live, then the manager should act consistently
with this desire: “He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility
is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally
will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”
[24] Furthermore, Friedman does not permit managers to increase
their profits by deceptive or fraudulent means: “In [a free] economy, there
is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition,
without deception or fraud.”
[25] But if the owners of the corporation are not willing to have
their wealth reduced by conforming to rules of society embodied in ethical custom,
then the manager should ignore those rules. Therefore, the only absolute ethical
responsibility of the business manager, according to Friedman, is the avoidance
of deception and fraud. Therefore, despite his rhetoric of equating “social
responsibility” with profit maximization, Friedman’s actual position is that
business managers should simply ignore all but the most minimal of ethical considerations.
2.3 Elaine
Steinberg
Elaine Sternberg regards
Friedman’s position as too weak:
"As a political
economist, Professor Friedman naturally castigates use of the firm’s resources
for nonprofitable moral purposes as ‘socialism’ and unauthorised ‘taxation’.
Far from being too harsh, that characterisation is in fact too polite. Using
business resources for non-business purposes is tantamount to theft:
an unjustified appropriation of the owners’ property. Managers who employ business
funds for anything other than the legitimate business objective are simply embezzling:
in using other people’s money for their own purposes, they are depriving owners
of their property as surely as if they had dipped their hands into the till.
"[26]
Steinberg attempts
to make her case by asserting: “What differentiates business from everything
else is its purpose: maximizing long-term owner value by selling goods or services.
Only this definitive goal is essential to business. All other goals are at best
incidental to business, and are justified for business only insofar as they
contribute to achievement of the definitive goal.”
[27] She then argues: “The purpose of business is not to promote
the public good. Business is a prime contributor to the public good, but that
role does not distinguish it from the other activities – medicine and education,
for example – that also are; promoting the public good therefore cannot be the
definitive purpose of business.”
[28]
This argument is unsound,
as can be demonstrated by constructing an obviously unsound argument of the
same logical form: “The purpose of a financial services company is not to maximize
long-term owner value. A financial service company is a prime contributor to
the maximization of long-term owner value, but that role does not distinguish
it from the other companies – manufacturing and transportation companies, for
example – that also are; maximizing long-term owner value therefore cannot be
the definitive purpose of a financial services company.” From the fact that
activities other than business promote the public good, it does not follow that
the purpose of business is not to promote the public good. It is possible that
organizations of two or more different categories have the same purpose.
This mistake is quickly
followed by another:
"To focus on
business’s function as a producer, supplier or adder of value is to misconstrue
business’s purpose. If the nature of the goods or services, or the way they
are produced, takes priority over maximizing long-term owner value, then the
activity involved is not business. An organization whose guiding principle is
producing the absolutely best widgets (e.g., engines, books, healthcare) or
the very cheapest ones – independent of the consequences for long-term owner
value – is not operating as a business... even if, incidentally, it sells
the widgets profitably. "[29]
This argument assumes
that if a manager rejects one extreme, he must embrace its polar opposite; either
the purpose of business is to maximize long-term owner value or the purpose
of business has nothing to do with long-term owner value. Another possibility,
however, is that the purpose of a particular business company is to produce
excellent widgets and to sell them at low prices, while recognizing that prudent
attention to owner value – though not necessarily maximizing it – is
among the necessary means to fulfilling its purpose.
While many philosophers
believe that teaching business ethics amounts to prostitution, because business
is necessarily unethical, Sternberg believes the same of pursuing business objectives
other than the maxim-ization of long-term owner value:
"Just as prostitution
occurs when sex is proffered for money rather than love, so it exists when business
pursues love – or ‘social responsibility’ – rather than money. Business managers
who eschew maximising long-term owner value, and direct their firms to any other
goal, are as much prostitutes as artists or sportsmen who sell out for financial
gain. In each case, the activity is perverted, and the ‘right, true end’ is
neglected in favour of some other, extraneous objective.
"[30]
Despite these provocative
statements, Sternberg provides nothing resembling a sound argument for her claim
that maximizing long-term owner value is in fact the right and true end of business
management.
Sternberg’s beliefs
about the relationship between ethics and the maximization of owner value suffer
from misconceptions about the nature of ethics. The introduction and six of
her book’s ten chapters begin with citations of Aristotle. Nevertheless, she
has a quite un-Aristotelian understanding of the relationship between ethics
and prudence:
"Being prudent
is not the same as being ethical. Checking for traffic before crossing the road
is prudent, but is not necessarily either moral or immoral. The wicked may prudently
try to conceal their villainy to avoid getting caught, but do not thereby become
good. In each case, the prudent act is simply the sensible one to do in the
circumstances, the judicious or reasonable thing to do. The ethical act, in
contrast, is that which is morally right.
"[31]
Checking for traffic
before crossing the road is not necessarily either moral or immoral, but neither
is it necessarily either prudent or imprudent. If the road is impassable, failing
to check for traffic before crossing it is not imprudent. When checking for
traffic is prudent, it is also moral. When failing to do so is imprudent, it
is also immoral. Persons who try to conceal their villainy to avoid getting
caught are villainous, not prudent. And to say that an ethical act is that which
is morally right is to offer a circular, unhelpful definition. Sternberg does
not say what distinguishes an ethical act from an unethical act, or a morally
right act from a morally wrong one.
In her next paragraph
she inserts a note suggesting that she is familiar with the Aristotelian understanding
of the relationship between prudence and ethics: “Although the ethical and the
prudent are conceptually distinct [note: though prudence has sometimes been
designated a (natural, cardinal) moral virtue], the same act can and often does
fall into both categories.”
[32] According to Aristotle, the ethical and the prudent are indeed
conceptually distinct, because prudence is only one of several virtues, and
is an intellectual virtue, not a moral one. But it is impossible for an action
to be prudent without also being ethical, or to be imprudent without also being
unethical. Sternberg does not explain why she disagrees with Aristotle at this
fundamentally important point. One’s understanding of the relationship between
ethics and prudence has enormous implications for one’s understanding of the
relationship between ethics and business management.
While Sternberg believes
that business has no social responsibilities, she follows Friedman in allowing
that the maximization of financial wealth should be subject to certain, minimal
ethical constraints:
"The key principles
of business ethics are identified as those enjoining the values without which
maximizing long-term owner value would be impossible: distributive justice and
ordinary decency. Distributive justice exists when organisational rewards are
distributed on the basis of contributions made to organizational goals. Ordinary
decency is not ‘niceness’, but the conditions of trust necessary both for taking
a long-term view and for surviving over the long term; it consists of honesty,
fairness, the absence of physical violence and coercion, and the presumption
of legality. "[33]
Sternberg’s inclusion
of “distributive justice” within business ethics is somewhat misleading. She
is not concerned with distributive justice within a national economy, only with
justice within business firms: “In its most general formulation, the principle
of distributive justice asserts that organizational rewards should be proportional
to contributions made to organizational ends.”
[34] The principle “to each according to his contribution to long-term
owner-value maximization” is a parody of Aristotelian distributive justice.
Sternberg’s limitation
of business ethics to distributive justice, honesty, fairness, refraining from
coercion and physical violence, and usually obeying the law, like Friedman’s
restriction of business ethics to engaging in open and free competition without
deception or fraud, means that some unethical, owner-value-maximizing actions
will be ruled out and others will be permitted. For example, let us assume that
a publisher of primary-school textbooks could attain greater long-term owner
value by diversifying and beginning to publish pornography. To do so would not
violate distributive justice, honesty, or fairness, nor would it require coercion
or physical violence. Therefore, if the laws of the land do not prohibit pornography,
the company is obligated to begin publishing it. If it fails to do so,
then it ceases to be a business entity: “Only when
an organization is seeking to maximize long-term owner value is it a business;
only then can distributive justice and ordinary decency be invoked as ethical
constraints on business activity.”
[35] Nevertheless, publishing pornography is unethical. Consequently,
Sternberg’s understanding of business ethics is mistaken.
Sternberg addresses
the fact that her model of business ethics permits unethical actions in the
final chapter of her book:
"There have been
some notable occasions in the argument when, though an issue has been raised,
no resolution has been offered. When, for example, the question arose as to
whether selling pornography or armaments might be immoral, or whether whistle-blowing
might be obligatory to prevent threats to public safety, the Ethical Decision
Model was not applied. And in the discussion of corporate wrong-doing, nothing
was said about how individuals should determine which business orders they should
obey. Such questions cannot be resolved in the same way as ordinary business
ethics issues because, strictly speaking, they are not questions of business
ethics. "[36]
Like Primeaux and Stieber,
Sternberg permits individuals to avoid and to resign from businesses whose owner-value-maximizing
actions conflict with their personal ethical beliefs: “If someone is opposed
to the sale of tobacco, then if he is acting on his principles he should not
buy tobacco. And to be consistent, he also ought not to work for or lend to
or invest in tobacco firms.”
[37] What she does not permit is a decision by the CEO of a retail
company that it will not sell tobacco, if selling tobacco would maximize its
long-term owner value, on the grounds that he believes doing so is unethical.
This is the case, however, only because she has arbitrarily decided that some
questions of the ethics of business fall within the domain of business ethics
and some fall outside it.
Sternberg sees no conflict
between business ethics and the maximization of long-term owner value:
“Since being ethical in business consists of maximizing long-term
owner value subject only to distributive justice and ordinary decency, it is
entirely plausible that ‘good ethics is good business’, even internationally.”
[38] Just as with Primeaux and Stieber, however, she is able to
avoid such conflict only because she has an inadequate conception of business
ethics. She believes that it is through “conscientious individual action that
social responsibility is properly understood.”
[39] And this is the case because she has the same individualistic
ontology of the firm as Hobbes, Bentham, Friedman, et al.: “A corporation
is a legal fiction, an artificial person.”
[40]
3. Business
Ethics
It is certainly true
that in many situations owner-value-maximizing actions are also ethical actions.
It is no less certain, however, that under some circumstances long-term owner-value
maximization and ethics conflict. Consequently, only a small minority of business
ethicists claims that good ethics is always or usually good business. Most writers
in the field agree that it is improper to focus on the maximization of profit
or owner value as the primary goal of management. The most popular “paradigm”
of business ethics today is “stakeholder theory”.
The stakeholder concept
originated within the discipline of strategic management, not business ethics,
at the Stanford Research Institute in the 1960s. It is indisputable that even
if a manager’s sole objective is to maximize long-term owner value, he must
take a diversity of “stakeholders”, persons who hold a stake in the activities
of the firm, into account in order to do so. One cannot maximize owner value
by focusing exclusively on owner value.
The person primarily
responsible for popularizing the stakeholder concept and introducing it into
business ethics is R. Edward Freeman.
[41] According to Freeman, “a Stakeholder in an organization is
(by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization’s objectives.”
[42] In some way or another, managers are supposed to take the interests
of all stakeholders into account when making decisions. Following Bentham, the
interest of the community is assumed to be the sum of the interests of the individual
members who compose it.
Some scholars have
attempted to develop a theory of business ethics in the social-contract tradition
and to distinguish it from stakeholder theory.
[43] This is a mistake, however, because stakeholder theory itself
stands squarely within the tradition of social contractarianism. Freeman explicitly
and appropriately uses “social contract” in describing stakeholderism: “Is the
corporation to be understood solely as a means to the creation of wealth for
stockholders, or can it be understood as a social contract among stockholders,
customers, suppliers, employees, and communities?”
[44]
Freeman and a co-author
agree fully with agency theorists such as Jensen and Meckling that the business
firm is a fiction: “Management plays a special role [in stakeholderism], for
it too has a stake in the fiction that is the modern corporation.”
[45] Despite their superficial differences, agency theory and stakeholder
theory share the fundamental ontological and anthropological assumptions of
the social contract tradition: that man is by nature individualistic, that human
society and institutions are artificial, and that there is no necessary relationship
between the individual good and the common good. In the words of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau:
"Each individual
can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or different from the general
will that he has as a citizen. His private interest can speak to him in an entirely
different manner than the common interest. His absolute and naturally independent
existence can cause him to envisage what he owes the common cause as a gratuitous
contribution, the loss of which will be less harmful to others than its payment
is burdensome to him. "[46]
When the philosophy
of conflict between private interest and common interest becomes the philosophy
of the modern business corporation, we have “agency problems”: “Top manager
opportunism means self-interest and self-serving behavior which is the result
of both discretionary power and ‘natural egotism’. The utility function of the
owner (the risk-bearer) and top manager (the risk taker) are only synonymous
when the owner and the
top manager are the same person, otherwise top managers may pursue their own
interests at the expense of others.”
[47] Stakeholder theory’s contribution to our understanding of the
ethical responsibilities of business managers is merely to increase the number
of individual parties to the social contract.
Such an individualistic
understanding of human society and human organizations is incompatible with
both the European cultural tradition and traditional African culture. Aristotle,
for example, argues that “the city belongs among the things that exist by nature,
and that man is by nature a political animal.”
[48] It is not a coincidence that the traditional
cultures of both Europe and Africa are non-individualistic. All traditional
cultures share this feature, because an individualistic culture is incapable
of standing the test of time.
Stakeholder theory
is an unsatisfactory business ethics theory, not only because it is based upon
a false understanding of human nature and human society, but also because it
has little, if anything, specific to say to practicing managers. One attractive
feature of agency theory is its simplicity; managers are to maximize a single
variable. By merely increasing the number of individual parties to the social
contract, without telling managers how – practically or even theoretically –
they are to weigh or choose between or reconcile the diversity of conflicting
interests, stakeholder theory renders itself irrelevant for managers who must
make decisions in the real world.
Agency theory is a
theory – a false theory, but nevertheless a theory – of business management.
Stakeholder theory, as a theory of business ethics, states correctly that agency
theory is false, but provides no alternative theory of business management.
It consequently has, in contrast to agency theory, little impact upon the actual
practice of management. Agency theory gives managers a theoretically precise
objective – albeit an incorrect one. Stakeholder theory gives managers a plurality
of undefined objectives. The CEO of a large, multinational company must consider
the individual interests of billions of stakeholders.
Within most universities
in the West or influenced by the West, there is a contradiction between what
students of business management are taught in their business courses and what
the same students are taught in their business ethics courses. Most business
management courses assume as an axiom that the objective of management is to
maximize profit or owner value, and then set about teaching students some aspect
of how to accomplish this. Most business ethics courses, whether they teach
stakeholderism or some other theory of business ethics, teach that some owner-value-maximizing
actions should not be performed, because they are unethical. The students are
on their own in resolving this contradiction within their business education
– or in dismissing business ethics as irrelevant to business management.
This unfortunate state
of affairs is possible, because universities are extremely compartmentalized
and each academic discipline has its own conferences, journals, and book series.
The career progression of a scholar in any discipline is determined more by
scholars in his own discipline at other universities than by scholars in other
disciplines at his own university. In many cases, e-mail “communities” of scholars
in the same discipline at different institutions are more influential in shaping
what faculty members teach than face-to-face communities within a single institution.
Business ethicists often do not care what their marketing or accounting or financial
management colleagues are teaching, and vice versa. But of what value is this
contradictory education to students after they graduate and enter the real world
of business? Is it any wonder that academic business ethics has so little influence
on the actual practice of business management?
What students of business
ethics and practicing business managers need is not a pair of theories – a business
management theory and a business ethics theory – that contradict one another,
but a single, unified, comprehensive theory of the ethical practice of business
management. We must go beyond business ethics to the philosophy of management,
because only philosophy is capable of developing a new theory of business management.
As Nigel Laurie and Christopher Cherry make the point in the inaugural issue
of Reason in Practice: The Journal of Philosophy of Management, “philosophy
of management is no more merely business ethics than philosophy of science is
scientific methodology.”
[49] It is impossible, however, to develop the requisite philosophical
theory of management within the tradition of Anglo-American individualism or
the social-contract tradition, because their understanding of the relationships
between individual persons and communities of persons is incorrect.
4. Philosophy
of Management
The only tradition
of Western philosophy within which an adequate theory of the ethical practice
of business management can be developed is that of Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine,
St. Thomas Aquinas, and many others, which was rejected by the intellectual
main-streams of Europe during the Enlightenment, but which has nevertheless
survived and has recently experienced renewed interest, in large part because
of the efforts of Alasdair MacIntyre to revive it. Although this tradition is
European, it is relevant to non-Europeans, because it includes and relies upon
a correct understanding of human nature, which is the same for all members of
the one human race. There are significant parallels between the Platonic-Aristotelian
tradition and the Asian Confucian tradition, especially in their respective
understandings of the individual and social virtues. And this European tradition
is compatible for the most part with traditional African cultures, which, though
not expressed in philosophical theories, have been articulated in oral traditions
that survive today.
Developing a theory
of business ethics within the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and
Aquinas is not simply a matter of recovering what persons in this tradition
wrote about business management. Most of the thinkers in this tradition exclude
business from the realm of activities consistent with living a virtuous life.
Plato recognizes the contribution of commercial activity to the ideal city-state,
but does not assign a specific virtue to artisans and merchants. While politicians
are wise and soldiers are courageous, businessmen only contribute to the temperance
and justice of the city-state as a whole by playing their subordinate role.
[50] In the process of answering affirmatively the question whether
there exists a species of the virtue of prudence for soldiers, prudentia
militaris, Aquinas says that there is no corresponding species of prudence
for artisans and traders: “Other matters in the state are directed to the profit
of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the protection
of the entire common good.”
[51] But while Aquinas’s statement that commercial activity is directed
to the profit of individuals may be correct as an observation of the actual
motives of most businessmen, nothing about the nature of such activity prevents
it from also being directed toward the common good. The existence of the virtue
of military prudence is not jeopardized by the existence of military officers
whose primary objective is career advancement, political power, or retirement
benefits. While traditional European philosophy does not include a theory of
the philosophy of management, it does contain the resources necessary to develop
such a theory, appropriate for and applicable to, contemporary business management.
Commercial activity,
directed by business managers, contributes to the common good by providing the
goods and services that enable us to live good lives. But it does this only
if its products are genuine goods and services. Contrary to the position of
Primeaux and Stieber, the purpose of business is not to provide whatever products
consumers are willing – or can be persuaded – to buy. If a firm’s products are
not truly good, producing them does not contribute to the common good. Lower-order
objectives are proper only if they stand in a proper relationship to higher-order
goals. As Patrick Riordan, SJ explains:
"On Aristotle’s
view, one may not simply take as sanctioned the goals of some set of activities,
but those goals must be understood as embedded in a hierarchy of goods which
are related to one another by means of the “for-the-sake-of” relationship. So,
for instance, the goals of flute-making are for the sake of the goals of flute-playing.
This way of thinking presupposes that there is a highest good for the sake of
which all other goods are pursued, an ultimate end relative to which all other
goods are subordinate. A genuinely Aristotelian approach to business ethics
[or philosophy of management], therefore, would not be content with asserting
the essential goal of business; it would have to ask further what are the goods,
and the ultimate good, for the sake of which the goals of business might be
pursued. "[52]
The ultimate good is
God. But the highest earthly good is the common good, the good of the community.
The proper objective of business is the production of genuine goods and services
for the sake of the common good. Although certainly not an Aristotelian, Henry
Ford made the point simply and succinctly in a 1919 interview: “A business that
makes nothing but money is a poor kind of business.”
Peter Koslowski argues
that financial objectives, while essential to business management, are secondary
to the business corporation’s purpose of producing goods and services:
"The necessary
condition for the existence of the firm and the main purpose for which firms
come into being is the production of products, not the production of profits
or shareholder value. This main purpose of the firm may only be realized if
sufficient returns on investment are earned, and in this sense, the realization
of shareholder value is a condition for the realization of the main purpose
of the firm; it is however not the first condition.
"[53]
Furthermore, as Koslowski
explains, the obligations of the firm are derived from its nature:
"It is an old
principle of the Aristotelian natural law tradition, also dominant in Catholic
social thought, that obligation arises from the nature of the matter: obligatio
oritur a natura rei... Applied to the theory of the firm, the principle
that the obligation is derived from the nature and purpose of the matter or
institution in question requires that the main ethical and legal obligation
of the firm must be deduced from its first purpose, and not from the conditions
which secure the realization of its purpose. This first purpose of the firm
is, however, not the maximization of the residual profit and of the share value
in the stock market but the production of optimal products under the condition
of the realization of the secondary goals of its member groups or stakeholders.
"[54]
John Dobson, relying
in part on MacIntyre’s work, advocates the opposite of Friedman’s and Sternberg’s
understanding of the relationship between financial maximization and business
ethics: “In FE [financial economics] to date, wealth maximization has been viewed
as the corporate objective, and ethics – if viewed at all – as the constraint.
A role reversal merits serious consideration.”
[55] Dobson’s suggestion is not that financial considerations are
unimportant. No plausible theory of business management could make that mistake.
Although the objective of the firm would not be to maximize a financial variable,
professional competence in financial management would be necessary to accomplish
the firm’s objective: “A constraint that the managers face in achieving
these broader [ethical] objectives is that they provide stockholders with a
fair return on their investment. By ‘fair’ we mean what FE would call ‘risk-adjusted’
i.e. a return commensurate with the uncertainty inherent in the corporation.
Thus this role reversal would not reject FE’s invaluable insights into the role
of risk and return.”
[56]
It is not true in the
case of a sole proprietorship that the goal of business management is to make
as much money as possible for the proprietor and that all means to that end
are justified. Therefore, from the fact that shareholders are the owners of
joint-stock companies it does not follow that all means to the maximization
of their wealth are justified. Furthermore, the popularity of “ethical” and
“socially responsible” mutual funds demonstrates that not all investors are
interested in maximizing shareholder value. Although these funds disagree
with one another about what it means to be ethical, they are all willing to
accept something less than owner-value maximization in order to avoid whatever
they consider to be unethical business practices or products.
Real-world management
requires decisions involving both quantitative and non-quantitative objectives.
That is true even more of management with the intention of producing genuine
goods and services, because this requires qualitative judgments about which
products are truly good. No theory of management based on the assumption that
managerial decision-making is purely quantitative would be worth serious consideration.
The professionally competent business manager will always require a sound understanding
of financial management. But in addition to that he will require the ability
to exercise sound professional judgment in cases where the objective cannot
be quantified. In the European tradition, professional judgment is understood
as the cardinal virtue of prudence (Greek - phronesis, Latin - prudentia).
And just as Aquinas recognized the species of military prudence, we can add
the species of managerial prudence. Prudence, like all of the virtues, is a
good habit and character trait. No one is born prudent, nor can anyone become
prudent by reading books and journals or by earning an MBA. One only becomes
prudent by experience. The junior manager who consistently makes good decisions,
until doing so becomes habitual, is capable of ascending to higher-level management,
where decisions of greater complexity are required.
Developing a unified,
comprehensive theory of the philosophy of management, a single theory that is
both a management theory and an ethical theory, must be based upon the virtue
of prudence, the virtue of the decision-maker. But this requires correcting
the widespread confusion of thinkers such as Sternberg, according to whom an
action can be prudent without being ethical. The belief that prudential and
ethical reasons for action can conflict with one another is one aspect of modern
European philosophy’s rejection of the traditional understanding that the good
life is not only good for others, but also good for the person living it. Rousseau’s
belief in a divergence of private interest and common interest is another manifestation
of this mistake.
While the requisite
philosophical theory of management must be constructed primarily from concepts
of the European philosophical tradition, it would be consistent with traditional
African society. C. O. Nzelibe draws a contrast between African and Western
management thought: “Constructing theory for African management thought will
not be advanced by assuming that what prevails in the Western world is applicable
also in the African environment.”
[57] But the differences that Nzelibe cites between African and
Western management thought are also differences between traditional and modern
Western philosophy and culture: “Implicitly, the fundamental assumptions of
Western management thought and African management thought are in direct conflict.
Whereas Western management thought advocates Eurocentricism, individualism,
and modernity, African management thought emphasizes ethnocentrism, traditionalism,
communalism, and cooperative teamwork.”
[58]
Nzelibe maintains that
adopting a modern-European understanding of management incompatible with traditional
African culture is responsible for unethical management practices in Africa
today: “The core dimensions of modern African management thought include traditionalism,
communalism, and cooperative teamwork. The exclusion of such factors from African
management practices and thinking has been responsible for managerial problems
such as nepotism, bribery, corruption, and an acute lack of discipline in organizations,
particularly in public servants.”
[59] It is an exaggeration to blame all business misconduct in contemporary
Africa on the replacement of traditional African management practices and thought
by modern Western management practices and thought. Even if management theory
were impeccable, original sin and individual sins would suffice to ensure that
business practices would never be perfectly ethical. But Nzelibe’s claim that
there is a correlation between unethical business management in Africa today
and the adoption of Western management theory is plausible and is consistent
with my claim that modern Western management theory is fundamentally and essentially
unethical. Furthermore, the antidote is not to supplement an unethical management
theory with an ethical theory that contradicts it.
5.
On Instilling Ethics in Business Corporations
According to Kelvin
Knight, “when asked why he declined an invitation to address a conference on
business ethics, MacIntyre replied that it was for the same reason that he wouldn’t
attend a conference on astrology”.
[60] As long as ethics is understood to be something distinct from
the purpose of business management, attempts to instill it in corporations are
doomed to failure. “Business ethics” will continue to be an oxymoron, like “artificial
intelligence” and “global village”.
When business management
is considered to be “positive” and business ethics “normative”, instilling ethics
in business will be like instilling oil in water. Or, to make the point in terms
of the purported distinction between “facts” and “values”, the “values-added”
approach to business ethics is guaranteed to fail. If the purpose of business
management is to make as much money as possible, whether for oneself or for
someone else, then there is room for ethics in business only when ethical conduct
will lead to making as much money as possible. If business management is to
become more ethical, we must radically revise our understanding of the proper
objective of business management. And for the nations of black Africa, whose
cultures are not individualistic – or at least were until they came into contact
with modern European culture – this requires rejecting an understanding of business
management rooted in the philosophy of their former colonial masters and accepting
one consistent with their own traditions.
One of the greatest
problems with modern Western ethical theories is that they are unable to provide
a motive for being ethical. That is why so many books on ethical theory have
a final chapter entitled something like “Why be ethical?”
[61] If it is not good for oneself to be ethical, why not do what
is good for oneself, instead of doing what is ethical? Modern Western business
ethics also suffers from this vice. When ownership and management are not separated,
maximizing owner value is considered to be in the manager’s interest. What motive
does he have to be ethical, instead of pursuing self-interest? With separation
of ownership and management, there are three mutually exclusive guides to action:
maximization of owner value, maximization of managerial utility, and ethical
management. With such a set of alternatives, why should any manager be ethical?
Modern European ethical theory and business ethics are incapable of satisfactorily
answering this question.
The solution to the
problem of moral motivation is not to give the manager a motive to act contrary
to his self-interest, but is instead to give him a richer understanding of his
own good. In the long tradition of European philosophy that was rejected during
the Enlightenment, the distinction between unethical and ethical conduct is
not understood in terms of egoism and altruism, but in terms of false self-love
and true self-love. Since the virtuous life is the best life, not only for other
persons but also for the person living it, there can be no conflict between
ethics and true self-love. And since possession of the virtue of prudence is
a necessary and sufficient condition for possession of the moral virtues, there
can be no conflict between ethics and prudence. The challenge is not to persuade
persons to act contrary to their self-interest, but to persuade them that it
is their self-interest to be ethical. When this is accomplished, moral motivation
is no longer a problem, because we are automatically motivated to do what we
believe is good for us.
If a philosophical
theory of the ethical practice of business management can be achieved, it will
be unnecessary to supplement it with a theory of business ethics. The virtue
of prudence, which St. Thomas analyzes in great detail, is the primary virtue
of the business decision-maker. Prudent decisions promote both the individual
good of the persons making them and the common good of the communities to which
they belong. Prudent business managers choose ethical means to the end of providing
genuine goods and services that promote the common good. The divergence between
maximizing long-term owner value and promoting the individual manager’s self-interest
cannot be eliminated, but the diffence between the latter and ethics is eliminated
in traditional European philosophy. In situations where maximizing owner-value
does diverge from managerial self-interest and ethics, the manager has an incentive
to do what is ethical, since it is good for him to do so. And if the ethics
of the ownership of business firms is understood within this philosophical tradition,
there is no need to align the interests of managers and owners, because it is
not in the interest of owners to maximize owner value unethically. Much work
remains to be done, but in this direction lies the solution to the problem of
instilling ethical standards in business organisations.
Presented
at the Second Annual Conference of the Business Ethics Network of Africa, “Instilling
Ethical Standards in Private and Public Sector Organisations: The Challenge
for Developing Countries”, Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria, 28-29 November
2002
I am grateful
for the critical comments of John A. Murray, Rev. Dr. Paul Mimbi, William Engdahl,
and Prof. Dr. J. M. Elegido on an earlier version of this paper.
NOTES
[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,
or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill,
London: Andrew Crooke, 1651, Introduction.
[2] Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789; 1823, I, iv.
[3] Milton Friedman, “The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits”, New York Times
Magazine, 13 September 1970.
[4] Michael C. Jensen and William
H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure”, revised version, in Economics and Social Institutions: Insights
from the Conferences on Analysis & Ideology, ed. Karl Brunner, Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1979, p. 171. Emphasis in the original.
[5] Eugene F. Fama, “Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy LXXXVIII,
2 (1980), p. 288.
[6] Steven N. S. Cheung, “The
Contractual Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Law & Economics, XXVI
(1983), p. 3.
[7] John
R. Grinyer, C. Donald Sinclair, and Daing Nasir Ibrahim, “Management Objectives
in Capital Budgeting”, Financial Practice and
Education, IX, 2 (1999), p. 12.
[8] Chamu Sundaramurthy, “Antitakeover
Provisions and Shareholder Value Implications: A Review and a Contingency
Framework”, Journal of Management, XXVI, 5 (2000).
[9] Raffi J. Indjejikian, Accounting
Horizons, XIII, 2 (1999).
[10] Two American companies that
sell fetal tissue and organs are Anatomic Gift Foundation, Inc. of White Oak,
Georgia, Laurel, Maryland, and Aurora,
Colorado, and Consultative and Diagnostic Pathology,
Inc. of West Frankfort,
Illinois and Overland Park, Kansas.
[11] Norman Barry, Anglo-American
Capitalism and the Ethics of Business, Wellington, New Zealand: Business
Roundtable, 1999, p. v:
[12] Patrick Primeaux and John
Stieber, “Profit Maximization: The Ethical Mandate of Business”, Journal
of Business Ethics, XIII (1994), pp. 287-94.
[13] Primeaux and Stieber, p. 290.
[14] Primeaux and Stieber, pp. 288-89.
[15] Michel Albert, Capitalisme
contre capitalisme, Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1991; trans. Paul Haviland, Capitalism
against Capitalism, London: Whurr Publishers, 1993; Capitalism vs.
Capitalism, New York: Four Walls, Eight Windows, 1993. Albert contrasts
Anglo-American capitalism and Rhine capitalism, and urges France to choose
the latter instead of the former.
[16] John Stieber, “The Role
of Profit in our Social Organization”, Handbook of Business Strategy,
1986-87 Yearbook, Boston: Warren, Gorham, & Lamont, Chap. 8., as cited
by Primeaux and Stieber, p. 288.
[17] Primeaux and Stieber, p.
288.
[18] Primeaux and Stieber, p.
289.
[19] Primeaux and Stieber, p.
292.
[20] Primeaux and Stieber, p.
293.
[21] Primeaux and Stieber, p.
288.
[22] Primeaux and Stieber, p.
293.
[23] Milton Friedman, “The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits”, New York Times
Magazine, 13 September 1970.
[25] Milton Friedman, Capitalism
and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 133.
[26] Elaine Sternberg, Just
Business: Business Ethics in Action, 2nd Ed., Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000, p. 41.
[31] Sternberg, pp. 74-75.
[41] Cf. Freeman, “Stockholders
and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance”, California
Management Review XXV (1983), pp. 88-106; Strategic Management: A
Stakeholder Approach, Boston: Pitman, 1984; Freeman and Daniel R. Gilbert,
Jr., Corporate Strategy and the Search for Ethics, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988: William M. Evan and Freeman, “A Stakeholder
Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism”, in Tom L. Beauchamp
and Norman E. Bowie, eds., Ethical Theory and Business, 3rd Ed., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988, pp. 97-106.
[42] Freeman,
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach,
Boston: Pitman, 1984, p. 46.
[43] Cf. T. W. Dunfee and Thomas
Donaldson, “Contractarian Business Ethics”, Business Ethics Quarterly,
V (1995), p. 173.
[44] Freeman, Business Ethics:
The State of the Art, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 4.
[45] Evan and Freeman, p. 102.
[46] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On
the Social Contract, trans. Donald A. Cress,
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987, p. 26.
[47] Yoser
Gadhoum, “Corporate Governance and Top Managers: Potential Sources of Sustainable
Competitive Advantage”, Human Systems Management, XVII, 3 (1998), p.
207.
[48] Aristotle, The Politics,
1253a2-3; trans. Carnes Lord, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984,
p. 37.
[49] Nigel Laurie and Christopher
Cherry, “Wanted: Philosophy of Management”, Reason in Practice, I,
1 (2001), p. 5.
[50] Plato, Republic,
Books II and IV.
[51] Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York:
Benziger Brothers, 1948, IIa-IIae, 50, 4.
[52] Patrick Riordan, SJ, “The
Purpose of Business and the Human Good”, paper presented at the Second International
Symposium on Catholic Social Thought and Management Education, University
of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, 27-30 July 1997, www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cstm/antwerp/p6.htm.
[53] Peter Koslowski, “The Limits
of Shareholder Value”, Journal of Business Ethics, XXVII
(2000), pp. 138-39.
[54] Koslowski, p. 139. Aristotelianism
can also be turned on its head: “At the heart of any clear understanding of
what constitutes good corporate governance is the Aristotelian notion that
institutions should be primarily understood in terms of their purpose; that
is, the telos that constitutes their fundamental aim . . . . Once a
business corporation loses sight of its corporate objective, or forgets that
its primary responsibility is maximisation of shareholder value, then it has
effectively betrayed its telos” (Samuel Gregg, “‘Stakeholder’ Theory:
What It Means For Corporate Governance”, Policy, XVII, 2 [2001], p.
33). Gregg’s appropriation of Aristotelian concepts, like Sternberg’s, is
sometimes quite un-Aristotelian.
[55] John Dobson, “Reconciling
Financial Economics and Business Ethics”, Business and Professional Ethics
Journal, X, 4 (1991), p. 37.
[57] C. O. Nzelibe, “The Evolution
of African Management Thought”, International
Studies of Management and Organization, XVI, 2 (1986), p. 6.
[58] Nzelibe, pp. 10-11. Eurocentrism
and ethnocentrism are not contradictory; Eurocentrism is European ethnocentrism.
[60] Kelvin Knight, ed., The
MacIntyre Reader, London: Polity Press, 1998, p. 284.
[61] For example: Kurt Baier,
“Why Should We Be Moral?”, last chapter of The Moral Point of View,
1958; William Frankena, “Why Be Moral?”, last sub-chapter of Ethics,
1963, 1973, and last lecture of Thinking about Morality, 1980; Peter
Singer, “Why Act Morally?”, last chapter of Practical Ethics, 1979,
1993; Fred Feldman, “Why Should I Be Moral?”, last section of penultimate
chapter of Doing the Best We Can, 1986; Richard A. Fumerton, “Why Should
I Be Moral?”, last section of final chapter of Reason and Morality: A Defense
of the Egocentric Perspective, 1990; Michael S. Pritchard, “Why Be Moral?”,
last chapter of On Becoming Responsible, 1991.
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